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ABSTRACT 
This paper validates Odera Oruka’s assertion that Pilosophic Sagacity is a pervasive 
phenomenon among African peoples. It argues that whereas Oruka mostly focused on 
the Kenyan social environment in defense of his thesis, his observations are also 
applicable to African communities outside Kenya’s borders, especially in their pre-
colonial settings, where there were people who interrogated the rationale of their 
cultures’ beliefs and practices. Towards this end, the paper deploys textual exegesis 




Chinua Achebe, Igbo, philosophic sagacity, Nigeria 
 
INTRODUCTION  
African philosophy has now overcome the need for definition. What is needed 
therefore is to identify fundamental concepts and principles within the African 
environment and to explain their philosophical character. The work of Odera Oruka 
represents an attempt to meet this need. However, a further need is to show in as 
many African communities as possible that these concepts and principles are indeed 
interrogated by philosophic sages. Critical thought is simply a rational activity on its 
own as pure thought, or in relation to action as praxis (Nwala 2010, 107). 
 
Consequently, my aim in this paper is to contextualize philosophic sagacity among 
the Igbo of South-Eastern Nigeria. My reflections focus on Chinua Achebe’s 
celebrated novel, Things Fall Apart, which is a work chronicling the indigenous Igbo 
world, and the impact of missionary and colonial activities on it. Through the elders 
of the community in the novel such as Okonkwo, Obierika and Uchendu, I seek to 
illustrate that there were sages among the Igbo, but in addition, there were critical and 
logical thinkers among the sages, a vindication of Oruka’s assertion that there were 
philosophically minded people in pre-colonial African communities. 
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While some might question the authenticity of this undertaking on the basis that 
Things Fall Apart is a novel and therefore fiction rather than fact, two considerations 
validate the present venture. First, novels and other creative literary works arise out of 
concrete socio-political realities, in Achebe’s case, the reality of an indigenous 
African culture subdued by Western colonialism. Second, the use of creative writing 
for philosophical reflection is not a new endeavour. Philosophers of the existentialist 
school have used novels and plays to express their p ilosophical views, with some of 
the best known works in this category being Jean-Paul S rtre’s novels and plays that 
earned him the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1964. 
 
WHAT IS PHILOSOPHIC SAGACITY? 
Philosophic sagacity is a concept developed by Odera Oruka, a Kenyan philosopher. 
Oruka used the term to explain that there were logical and critical African individuals 
in pre-colonial Africa, and because of the depth of their reasoning, they were 
philosophers and their reflections philosophical. Prof. Paul Radin had earlier stated 
that in every society, and with respect to ancient and traditional societies in Africa, 
there were individuals who occupied themselves with the basic problems of what we 
customarily term philosophy (cited in  Momoh 2000, 12). A sage, according to Oruka, 
is usually an opinion leader, frequently consulted by people because he is versed in 
the wisdom and traditions of his people, and is wise within the conventional and 
historical confines of his culture. Thus a sage is a custodian of the traditions of his 
people. Philosophic sagacity is the product of the reflections of a person who is both a 
sage and a critical thinker. This implies that a person can be a sage and not a critical 
thinker (this would be an ordinary sage as contrasted with the philosophic sage). 
 
Odera Oruka initiated a series of dialogues with Kenyan African elders, and 
concluded that some of them had individualistic andpersonal answers to issues just as 
others were also guided by cultural philosophy. He stated that the aim of his research 
was “to help substantiate or invalidate the claim that traditional African peoples 
were innocent of logical and critical thinking” (Oruka 1991, 17). Consequently, he 
went on to identify his philosophical interlocutors by names just as ancient Greek 
philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes were all referred to by 
name, and general ideas about the originative stuffof the universe attributed to them. 
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The background to Oruka’s assertion was the earlier pr vailing opinion, held by a 
number of Western scholars, that what Africans had were communal thought, folk 
philosophy, ethno philosophy, et cetera, and not qualified to be labelled as 
philosophy. In this, they had the support of African post-colonial philosophers and 
collaborators who C.S. Momoh (2000, 16) labelled African logical neo-positivists 
because they chose to deny philosophic status to Africans in order to be compliant 
with the prevailing opinions overseas. Nwala (2010, 11) commented that most 
people who engaged in the debate between ethnophilosophy and professional 
philosophy had a very limited historical perspective of the issue, especially on the 
Eurocentric revision of world intellectual heritage, which instead of acknowledging 
the Egyptian origins of European thought as Homer, Isaac Newton and many others 
did, denied this origin and asserted instead that European social and intellectual 
evolution and tradition started with the Greeks (in Philosophy and Science), the 
Hebrews (in Religion) and the Romans (in Law and Administration). This denial of 
philosophic thought to Africans was unfortunate because all human beings possess the 
same mental characteristics (Burns 1963, 429). In this paper we seek to undertake an 
inquiry similar to Odera Oruka’s, in our case among the Igbo of South-eastern 
Nigeria. 
 
The Igbo and their Philosophies 
The Igbo of south-eastern Nigeria are one of the most d minant groups in West 
Africa. According to Uchendu, “the Igbo world is not only a world in which people 
strive for equality, it is one in which change is constantly expected. Its contractual 
character makes it a constantly changing world” (Uchendu 1963, 15). One basic 
contract is that between human beings and spirits which, for the Igbo, is not simply 
permanent, for at times the spirits may change their roles just as human beings do. 
Whenever the spirits do not adequately perform the rol s assigned to them, they are 
replaced by more pragmatic ones. Concerning this Nwala rote: 
Igbo traditional worldview, no doubt, was religiously-based but 
dynamic and pragmatic. The cosmological system is spirit-regarding. 
Not only is the world conceived as swarming with spirits, but 
everything including man (madu), and things (ihe) are conceived as 
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basically spiritual. However, within their religious outlook, the 
economic and physical survival of the people is their primary 
objective. Everything is centered on the economic activity of the 
people. The functions of spirits are essentially economic and 
materialistic (Nwala 2010,  115). 
 
The dynamism of a society is usually precipitated by some critically-minded 
individuals who are engaged in reflection about their society. Basing our reflections 
on Achebe’s Things Fall Apart, we shall show instances of people who were cultural 
philosophers, but more importantly, others who at times disagreed with what may be 
called popular opinions by holding individual critical, logical and constructive ideas. 
 
Early in the Novel, a story is told of Obiako, who queried an oracular injunction, 
because he felt it was not in accord with common sense and right judgement. Obiako 
had gone to the Oracle for consultation, whereupon the Oracle told him that his dead 
father (who had bequeathed him nothing) wanted him to sacrifice a goat to him. In 
response, Obiako was said to have retorted: “Ask my dead father if he ever had a fowl 
when he was alive” (Achebe 2008, 16). 
 
This retort is interesting for a people whose consciousness is influenced by the 
decisions of the gods. This act of disobedience is difficult to believe for such a 
community, as is shown in another episode about the We k of peace, when every one 
is expected to be at peace with his colleagues and neighbours. Okonkwo was insulted 
by his wife, Ekwefi, whereupon he beat her, making the Chief priest of the 
Community to visit him and demand a cleansing. When Okonkwo was trying to 
provide justification for his action, the Chief priest said: 
“Listen to me,” …. “You are not a stranger in Umuofia. You know as 
well as I do that our forefathers ordained that before we plant any 
crops in the earth we should observe a week in which a man does not 
say a harsh word to his neighbour. We live in peace with our fellows to 
honour our great goddess of the Earth without whose blessing our 
crops will not grow. You have committed a great evil. …. Your wife 
was at fault, but even if you came into your obi [hut] and found her 
lover on top of her, you would still have committed a great evil to beat 
her. …. The evil you have done can ruin the whole clan. The earth 
goddess whom you have insulted may refuse to give us her increase 
and we shall all perish …” (Achebe 2008, 24). 
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In another instance involving the killing of Ikemefuna, a boy received as ransom from 
another clan and put under the custody  of Okonkwo, a killing which was believed to 
have been commanded by a Deity, Ogbuefi Ezeudu, referred to as the oldest man in 
the quarter of Okonkwo’s village, visited Okonkwo and gave advice that is relevant to 
a defence of the existence of philosophic sages among the Igbo: “That boy calls you 
father. Do not bear a hand in his death” (Achebe 2008, 45). He further cautioned 
Okonkwo thus: 
”Yes, Umuofia has decided to kill him. The Oracle of the Hills and the 
Caves has pronounced it. They will take him outside Umuofia as is the 
custom, and kill him there. But I want you to have nothing to do with 
it. He calls you his father” (Achebe 2008, 46). 
  
Sadly, Okonkwo did not heed this sound advice, and went ahead to accompany the 
group of men who carried out the execution, and in fact was the one that killed 
Ikemefuna. When he returned from that gruesome mission, he engaged in a very 
enlightening dialogue with Obierika, an elder whose thought is the major plank of our 
argument in defence of the presence of philosophic sagacity among the Igbo. Obierika 
displays an intimate acquaintance with the culture of his people, but also exhibits a 
critical outlook towards it: 
“I cannot understand why you refused to come with us to kill that 
boy,” he asked Obierika. 
“Because I did not want to,” Obierika replied sharply. “I had 
something better to do.” 
“You sound as if you question the authority and the decision of the 
Oracle, who said he should die.” 
“I do not. Why should I?. But the Oracle did not ask me to carry out its 
decision.” 
“But someone had to do it. If we were all afraid of blood, it would not 
be done. And what do you think the Oracle would do then?” 
“You know very well, Okonkwo, that I am not afraid of blood, and if 
anyone tells you that I am, he is telling a lie. And let me tell you one 
thing, my friend. If I were you, I would have stayed at home. What you 
have done will not please the Earth. It is the kind of action for which 
the goddess wipes out whole families.” 
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“The Earth cannot punish me for obeying her messenger,” Okonkwo 
said. “A child’s fingers are not scalded by a piece of hot yam which its 
mother puts into its palm.” 
“That is true,” Obierika agreed. “But if the Oracle said that my son 
should be killed, I would neither dispute it nor bethe one to do it” 
(Achebe 2008, 52-53). 
 
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
The Igbo, like many other African ethnic groups, have a predominantly communal 
outlook. This is traced to their theistic cosmology. Because of fear of the wrath of 
God, they respond unquestioningly to oracular injunctio s, as shown in the earlier part 
of this paper through the dialogue between the Chief Pri st and Okonkwo during the 
week of peace. However, Igbo beliefs about God, human beings and the physical 
environment are the result of critical reflection. The greatest vindication of this fact is 
the supplementary thesis of “existential gratitude” (Momoh 2000, 425), which states 
that when a deity is not performing positively for the people, Africans can remove 
him and replace him with another, or create another existent which serves their 
purpose. 
 
Among the Igbo, the individual perspectives of membrs of the community are highly 
esteemed, a fact which is evident in the Igbo saying that “Uche one adigha njo”, 
meaning as there are different human beings, so are there very many shades of 
opinion. Consequently, whatever position is adopted for implementation is based on 
consensus, which rather than being the opinion of the majority, is arrived at through 
negotiation that takes into account all shades of opini n. Respect for the individual’s 
opinion among the Igbo is evident in the incident, earlier cited, of the man who 
contested his dead father’s demand for a goat. This is backed by an Igbo proverb that 
“when a native priest is divining for you, you too must also be divining for yourself”, 
meaning that one is expected to rationally sieve th truth, instead of accepting 
complacently whatever the priest says. 
 
Obierika, Okonkwo’s friend, and Ogbuefi Ezeudu, theoldest man in the quarter of 
Okonkwo’s village, offer us the best evidence of the presence of philosophic sages 
among the Igbo. Obierika had three wives, and had te same number of titles as 
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Okonkwo, which goes to show that he represents a high ranking member of the Igbo 
community. Yet, while Okonkwo represented the communal custodian of Igbo 
thought, an ordinary sage, Obierika and Ogbuefi Ezeudu exemplify our earlier 
assertion that their philosophies are derived from experience. Their advice to 
Okonkwo not to have a hand in killing Ikemefuna is a function of a psycho-spiritual 
reason backed by sound logic. One’s child is an extension of oneself, and the 
annihilation of oneself is self-contradictory. Okonwo’s uncritical actions gradually 
led him to commit suicide, an abominable act in Igboland , leaving Obierika, the 
philosopher, to mourn him. Thus Ogbuefi Ezeudu’s and Obierika’s variance with 
communal thought is in accord with Odera Oruka’s thesis of the existence of 
indigenous African men and women who hold opinions ba ed on critical reflection. 
 
As further evidence of deep philosophical reflection n Obierika’s part, When 
Okonkwo accidentally killed the son of a kinsman, a female ochu, an act for which 
the offender’s house and belongings had to be burnt, Obierika participated with others 
in the destruction of Okonkwo’s property, but afterwa ds went into deep reflection: 
As soon as the day broke, a large crowd of men fromEzeudu’s quarter 
stormed Okonkwo’s compound, dressed in garbs of war. They set fire 
to his houses, demolished his red walls, killed hisanimals and 
destroyed his barn. It was the justice of the earth goddess, and they 
were merely her messengers. They had no hatred in their hearts against 
Okonkwo. His greatest friend, Obierika, was among them. They were 
merely cleansing the land which Okonkwo had polluted with the blood 
of a clansman. 
 
Obierika was a man who thought about things. When t will of the 
goddess had been done, he sat down in his obi and mourned his 
friend’s calamity. Why should a man suffer so grievously for an 
offence he had committed inadvertently? But although he thought for a 
long time, he found no answer. He was merely led into greater 
complexities. He remembered his wife’s twin children, whom he had 
thrown away. What crime had they committed?. The Earth had decreed 
that they were an offence on the land and must be destroyed. And if the 
clan did not exact punishment for an offence against the great goddess, 
her wrath was loosed on all the land and not just on he offender. As 
the elders said, if one finger brought oil, it soiled the others.(Achebe 
2008, 100) 
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By participating in the cleansing ceremony of destroying Okonkwo’s property, 
Obierika was in accord with the traditions of the Igbo. Yet he had time for critical 
reflection. Here again, the fact of Obierika’s criti al reflection on the issue indicates 
the process through which changes are effected in society. With such reflection comes 
a conviction which requires action. The beginning of change in society is critical 
reflection with a view to finding solutions to pertinent problems. 
 
It is worth noting that the Igbo, like several other African societies, were throwing 
away twins not because they were foolish, but rathe because they were informed by 
experience. They reasoned that it was only in the anim l kingdom that twins and 
triplets, et cetera are born. The error inherent in this thinking was similar to the earlier 
Western belief in the geocentric hypothesis which was later shown to be false and 
replaced by the heliocentric hypothesis. What is more, there are ethical considerations 
behind the Igbo custom which were rationally defensible. The belief in the 
commonality of all human beings is succinctly expressed in the idea of “one oiled 
finger soiling others”. It teaches the great principle of brotherhood, respect for the 
value of each and every human being, and ultimately an ecological respect for all 
entities in nature. It is an injunction against peol  causing cosmic, planetary or 
communal damage because of personal interest. This is indicative of mature ethical 
reflection. 
 
Obierika’s outlook is no doubt the kind which Oruka regarded as that of a philosophic 
sage who is not only wise, but also rational and critical in understanding or solving 
the inconsistencies of his or her culture, and coping with foreign encroachments on it. 
Oruka explained that “as thinkers, they opt for or recommend only those aspects of 
the belief and wisdom which satisfy their rational scrutiny. In this respect, they are 
potentially or contemporarily in clash with the die-hard adherents of the prevailing 
common beliefs” (Oruka 1991, 178). Such people are not simply sagacious elders, but 
philosophic sages - they rise beyond the sphere of sagacity to the realm of critical 
thought (cf. Azenabor 2009, 74). Their reflections serve as a source of reform to their 
communities, offering insightful solutions to fundamental problems. The thoughts and 
actions of Obierika concur with these characteristics, and are different from those of 
elders such as Okonkwo, who are simply folk sages. 
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Philosophy engages in critical reflection on our everyday challenges and tries to 
proffer meanings out of the confusions and complexities that life throws at us. A 
philosopher is usually a child of his or her culture. As such, although the answers he 
or she gives to pertinent questions may be universal, the backdrop of his or her 
reflections is always the peculiar problems of his or her environment and time. 
 
Further evidence of Obierika’s critical approach is provided when he reminisces on 
the effect of colonialism with its attendant pollution and desecration of Igboland. 
Against Okonkwo’s suggestion for the community to bear arms and chase away the 
white man from their land, Obierika evaluates the situation as follows: 
“It is already too late. Our own men and sons have joined the ranks of 
the stranger. They have joined his religion and they lp to uphold his 
government. If we should try to drive out the white m n in Umuofia, 
we should find it easy. There are only two of them. But what of our 
own people who are following their way and have been given power?. 
They would go to Umuru and bring the soldiers and we would be like 
Abame… 
“How do you think we can fight when our own brothers have turned 
against us?. The white man is very clever. He came qui tly and 
peaceably with his religion. We were amused at his foolishness and 
allowed him to stay. Now he has won our brothers, and our clan can no 
longer act like one. He has put a knife on the things that held us 
together and we have fallen apart” (Achebe 2008, 140-141) 
 
Evidence of a critical and reflective outlook in some of the sages is also exhibited in a 
conversation between the white man, Mr. Brown, and o e of the great men of the 
land, Ogbuefi Akunna. Mr. Brown had argued that the Christian God was the only 
true one, and that the African God was not. In his attempt to persuade Akunna to do 
away with his God, the latter responded: 
“You say that there is one supreme God who made heaven nd earth. 
We also believe that and call him, Chukwu. He made the entire world 
and other gods” (Achebe 2008, 142). 
Against the accusation that Africans worship idols made from wood, Akunna replied: 
“Yes, it is indeed a piece of wood. The tree from which it came was 
made by Chukwu, as indeed all minor gods were. But he made them 
for his messengers so that we could approach him throug  them. … we 
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make sacrifices to the little gods but when they fail and there is no one 
else to turn to, we go to Chukwu … we appear to pay greater attention 
to the little gods but that is not so. We worry them more because we 
are afraid to worry their Master. Our fathers knew that Chukwu was 
the Overlord and that is why many of them gave their ch ldren the 
name Chukwuka - God is Supreme” (Achebe 2008, 143-144). 
 
Against the assertion that we should not fear God because he is a God of Love, 
Akunna replied: “But we must fear him when we are not doing His will, and who is to 
tell His will?. It is too great to be known” (Acheb 2008, 143). 
 
When Okonkwo is forced to go to exile following his inadvertent killing of a 
kinsman, he goes to his mother’s kinsmen. There he broods about the fate that had 
befallen him. Ogbuefi Uchendu, the head of his mother’s kinsmen, gathers his entire 
family and before he gives his advice, says, “it is Okonkwo that I primarily wish to 
speak to, but I want all of you to note what I am goin  to say.“ In the fashion of 
Socrates who is fond of raising questions, he raises a series of thought-provoking 
questions: 
“…why is Okonkwo with us today?. This is not his clan. We are only 
his mother’s kinsmen. He does not belong here. He is an exile 
condemned for seven years to live in a strange land. A  so, he is 
bowed with grief. But there is just one question I would like to ask 
him. Can you tell me, Okonkwo, why it is that one of the commonest 
names we give our children is Nneka or ‘Mother is Supreme’? We all 
know that a man is the head of the family and his wives do his bidding. 
A child belongs to its father and his family and not to its mother and 
her family. A man belongs to his fatherland and not to his motherland. 
And yet we say Nneka - Mother is Supreme. There is another question: 
Why is it that when a woman dies, she is taken home to be buried with 
her own kinsmen?. She is not buried with her husband’s kinsmen. Why 
is that? Your mother was brought home to me and buried with my 
people. Why was that?” (Achebe 2008, 106). 
When Okonkwo replies that he does not know, Ogbuefi Uchendu chides him for not 
knowing, yet he is full of sorrow because he has come to live in his motherland for a 
few years. He then proceeds to tell them the answer thus: 
“It is true that a child belongs to its father. But when a father beats his 
child, it seeks sympathy in its mother’s hut. A man belongs to his 
fatherland when things are good and life is sweet. Bu  when there is 
sorrow and bitterness, he finds refuge in his motherland. Your mother 
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is there to protect you. She is buried there and that is why we say that 
mother is supreme. Is it right that you, Okonkwo shuld bring to your 
mother a heavy face and refuse to be comforted?. Be car ful or you 
may displease the dead. Your duty is to comfort your wives and 
children and take them back to your fatherland after seven years. But if 
you allow sorrow to weigh you down and kill you, they will all die in 
exile…. These are now your kinsmen, you think you are the greatest 
sufferer in the world. Do you know that men are someti es banished 
for life?. Do you know that men sometimes lose all their yams and 
even their children?. I had six wives once. I have none now except that 
young girl who knows not her right from her left. Do you know how 
many children I have buried - children I begot in my youth and 
strength?. Twenty-two. I did not hang myself and I am still alive. If 
you think you are the greatest sufferer in the world, ask my daughter, 
Akueni, how many twins she has borne and thrown away … I have no 
more to say to you” (Achebe 2008, 107). 
 
The answers that Ogbuefi Uchendu offers are borne out of deep reflection. The 
answers, though arising out of a specific situation, are universal. 
 
Logical clarity is further seen in the way argument is presented in Igbo gatherings. 
The first step is to awake the mind and emotion through passionate salute which 
forces attention. This is usually followed by a speech which introduces the issue to be 
deliberated upon. Eventually, the main reason for a resolution to pursue a particular 
course of action is offered and is usually laced with proverbs. All this is evident when 
the people of Umuofia gather to discuss their reaction to the menace of the white man. 
After Ogbuefi Onyeka who had a commanding voice with which to draw attention 
and call the assembly to order had saluted the people,  Ogbuefi Okika marshalled the 
following argument: 
“You all know why we are here, when we ought to be building our 
barns or mending our huts, when we should be putting our compounds 
in order… 
“All our gods are weeping. Idemili is weeping, Ogwugwu is weeping, 
Agbala is weeping, and all the others. Our dead fathers are weeping 
because of the shameful sacrilege they are suffering a d the 
abomination we have all seen with our eyes 
“This is a great gathering. No clan can boast of greater members or 
greater valour. But are we all here?. I ask you: Are all the sons of 
Umuofia with us here? They are not. They have broken th  clan and 
gone their several ways. We who are here this morning have remained 
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true to our fathers, but our brothers have deserted us and joined a 
stranger to soil their fatherland. If we fight the stranger we shall hit our 
brothers and perhaps shed the blood of a clansman. But we must do it. 
Our fathers never dreamt of such a thing , they never killed their 
brothers. But a white man never came to them. So, we must do what 
our fathers would never have done” (Achebe 2008, 161-162). 
 
Even with the threat of the white man’s power, the people still meet to discuss their 
affairs and provide solutions to their problems. Unfortunately, while this meeting is 
going on, the court messengers sent by the District Commissioner to stop the meeting 
walk into the gathering in their usual arrogant, intimidating manner. Okonkwo 
challenges one of them, and when he blurts the order for the meeting to stop, 
Okonkwo, in anger, quickly brings out his matchet and kills him. With his people 
having failed to support him by arresting the other court messengers, and fearing what 
would happen to him if the District Commissioner comes to arrest him, Okonkwo 
goes home and takes his own life. When the District Commissioner comes to arrest 
Okonkwo and finds him hanging on a tree, Obierika, who had been gazing at his 
friend’s dangling body, turns suddenly to the District Commissioner and says 
ferociously: “That man was one of the greatest men in Umuofia. You drove him to kill 
himself and now he will be buried like a dog “ (Achebe 2008, 165). Suicide is one of 
the issues addressed in applied ethics, with a view to determining whether under 
certain circumstances one ought to protect one’s honour or run away from shame. 
Igbo ethics views suicide as cowardice and an abomination. A man must always 
continue to strive and not to take his own life, otherwise he loses honour and is buried 
in the evil forest.  
 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing exegesis, we conclude that as Achebe demonstrated in Things 
Fall Apart, there are philosophic sages among the Igbo. These men and women are 
critical of the prevailing communal thought and are wont to reflect on the state of 
affairs of the community, and in some instances come up with conclusions and 
prescriptions that are at variance with their community’s worldview. They differ from 
the ordinary sages who Oruka explained do not undertake critical reflection: “… 
some of the sages are simply moralists and the disciplined, die-hard faithful of a 
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tradition. Others are merely historians and good interpreters of the history and 
customs of their people” (Oruka 1991, 177). One can question the kind of ratio of 
philosophic sages to folk sages in the community, but that would not lead to the 
conclusion that there were no critically minded individuals. The reason for their 
limitation naturally, according to Onwuejeogwu (1992, 224), was the psychological 
prohibition in the community. Thus we can appreciate the likes of Obierika, Uchendu 
and Ezeudu who risked social opprobrium and went ahead to have individual, critical 
and sagacious reflections on the pertinent issues facing their society. Nnamdi Azikiwe 
acknowledged the role of these people as follows: 
By delving into the various schools of philosophy, I was convinced 
that although the [Western] system was more systematic than the 
African, nevertheless, African philosophy was practical in the sense 
that people did not waste time on logic and frivolous arguments. Their 
philosophy was more pragmatic in that it was related to the pragmatic 
problems of everyday life, which they solved by adapting themselves 
to the logic of reason and experience (Azikiwe 1970, 120). 
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